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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the vulnerability space arising in Trusted Ex-
ecution Environments (TEEs) when interfacing a trusted enclave
application with untrusted, potentially malicious code. Consider-
able research and industry effort has gone into developing TEE
runtime libraries with the purpose of transparently shielding en-
clave application code from an adversarial environment. However,
our analysis reveals that shielding requirements are generally not
well-understood in real-world TEE runtime implementations. We
expose several sanitization vulnerabilities at the level of the Ap-
plication Binary Interface (ABI) and the Application Programming
Interface (API) that can lead to exploitable memory safety and side-
channel vulnerabilities in the compiled enclave. Mitigation of these
vulnerabilities is not as simple as ensuring that pointers are out-
side enclave memory. In fact, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art
mitigation techniques such as Intel’s edger8r, Microsoft’s “deep
copy marshalling”, or even memory-safe languages like Rust fail
to fully eliminate this attack surface. Our analysis reveals 35 en-
clave interface sanitization vulnerabilities in 8 major open-source
shielding frameworks for Intel SGX, RISC-V, and Sancus TEEs. We
practically exploit these vulnerabilities in several attack scenarios
to leak secret keys from the enclave or enable remote code reuse.
We have responsibly disclosed our findings, leading to 5 desig-
nated CVE records and numerous security patches in the vulnerable
open-source projects, including the Intel SGX-SDK, Microsoft Open
Enclave, Google Asylo, and the Rust compiler.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Minimization of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) has always
been one of the key principles underlying the field of computer se-
curity. With an ongoing stream of vulnerabilities in mainstream op-
erating system and privileged hypervisor software layers, Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs) [28] have been developed as a
promising new security paradigm to establish strong hardware-
backed security guarantees. TEEs such as Intel SGX [8], ARM Trust-
Zone [34], RISC-V Keystone [21], or Sancus [32] realize isolation
and attestation of secure application compartments, called enclaves.
Essentially, TEEs enforce a dual-world view, where even compro-
mised or malicious system software in the normal world cannot
gain access to the memory space of enclaves running in an iso-
lated secure world on the same processor. This property allows
for drastic TCB reduction: only the code running in the secure
world needs to be trusted for enclaved computation results. Nev-
ertheless, TEEs merely offer a relatively coarse-grained memory
isolation primitive at the hardware level, leaving it up to the enclave
developer to maintain useful security properties at the software
level. This can become particularly complex when dealing with
interactions between the untrusted host OS and the secure enclave,
e.g., sending or receiving data to or from the enclave. For this rea-
son, recent research and industry efforts have developed several
TEE runtime libraries that transparently shield enclave applications
by maintaining a secure interface between the normal and secure
worlds. Prominent examples of such runtimes include Intel’s SGX-
SDK [19], Microsoft’s Open Enclave SDK [29], Graphene-SGX [43],
SGX-LKL [35], Google’s Asylo [13], and Fortanix’s Rust-EDP [11].
There are some differences in the way each trusted runtime
handles input/output data to and from the enclave. At the system
level, all TEEs offer some form of ecall/ocallmechanism to switch
from the normal to the secure word (and vice versa). Building on
this hardware-level isolation primitive, TEE runtimes aim to ease
enclave development by offering a higher level of abstraction to
the enclave programmer. Particularly, commonly used production-
quality SDKs [19, 29] offer a secure function call abstraction, where
untrusted code is allowed to only call explicitly annotated ecall
entry points within the enclave. Furthermore, at this level of ab-
straction the enclave application code can call back to the untrusted
world by means of specially crafted ocall functions. It is the TEE
runtime’s responsibility to safeguard the secure function call ab-
straction by sanitizing low-level ABI state and marshalling input
and output buffers when switching to and from enclave mode. How-
ever, the SDK-based approach still leaves it up to the developer to
manually partition secure application logic and design the enclave
interface. As an alternative to such specifically written enclave code,
one line of research [1, 2, 42, 43] has developed dedicated enclave
library OSs that seamlessly enforce the ecall/ocall abstraction at
the system call level. Ultimately, this approach holds the promise
to securely running unmodified executables inside an enclave and
fully transparently applying TEE security guarantees.
Over the last years, security analysis of enclaved execution has
received considerable attention from a microarchitectural side-
channel [24, 26, 30, 45, 46] and more recently also transient execu-
tion perspective [5, 20, 44]. However, in the era where our commu-
nity is focusing on patching enclave software against very advanced
Spectre-type attacks, comparably little effort has gone into explor-
ing how resilient commonly used trusted runtimes are against plain
architectural memory-safety style attacks. Previous research [3, 22]
has mainly focused on developing techniques to efficiently exploit
traditional memory safety vulnerabilities in an enclave setting, but
has not addressed the question how prevalent such vulnerabilities
are across TEE runtimes. More importantly, it remains largely un-
explored whether there are new types of vulnerabilities or attack
surfaces that are specific to the unique enclave protection model
(e.g., ABI-level misbehavior, or API-level pointer poisoning in the
shared address space). Clearly, the enclave interface represents an
important attack surface that so far has not received the necessary
attention and thus is the focus of this paper.
Our contribution. In this paper, we study the question of how
a TEE trusted runtime can securely “bootstrap” from an initial
attacker-controlled machine state to a point where execution can be
safely handed over to the actual application written by the enclave
developer. We start from the observation that TEE runtimes hold
the critical responsibility of shielding an enclave application at
all times to preserve its intended program semantics in a hostile
environment. As part of our analysis, we conclude that the complex
shielding requirement for an enclave runtime can be broken down
into at least two distinct tiers of responsibilities.
In a first ABI-level tier, we consider that upon enclave entry,
the adversary usually controls a significant portion of the low-
level machine state (e.g., CPU registers). This requires sanitization,
typically implemented through a carefully crafted enclave entry
assembly routine to establish a trustworthy ABI state as expected
by the compiled application code. Examples of trusted runtime
responsibilities at this level include switching to a private call stack,
clearing status register flags that may adversely affect program
execution, or scrubbing residual machine state before enclave exit.
Secondly, we consider that the enclaved binary itself makes cer-
tain API-level assumptions. Here we pay particular attention to
pointers and size arguments, because in many TEE designs [8, 21,
32], at least part of the enclave’s address space is shared with un-
trusted adversary-controlled code. Hence, the enclaved binary may
assume that untrusted pointer arguments are properly sanitized to
point outside of trusted memory, or that ocall return values have
been scrutinized. Our main contributions are:
• We categorize enclave interface shielding responsibilities into
10 distinct classes, across the ABI and API tiers (cf. Table 1).
• We analyze 8 widely used enclave runtimes, revealing a recur-
ring vulnerability landscape, ranging from subtle side-channel
leakage to more grave types of memory safety infringements.
• We practically demonstrate according attacks in various ap-
plication scenarios by extracting full cryptographic keys, and
triggering controlled enclave memory corruptions.
• We show that state-of-the-art automated enclave interface san-
itization approaches such as edger8r, or even the use of safe
languages like Rust, fail to fully prevent our attacks, highlight-
ing the need for more principled mitigation strategies.
Responsible disclosure. All of the security vulnerabilities de-
scribed in this work have been responsibly disclosed through the
proper channels for each affected TEE runtime. In each case, the
issues have been verified and acknowledged by the developers. In
the case of Intel, this can be tracked via CVE-2018-3626 and CVE-
2019-14565, and for Microsoft via CVE-2019-0876, CVE-2019-1369,
and CVE-2019-1370. The weakness found in Fortanix-EDP led to a
security patch in the Rust compiler. For other open-source projects,
our reports have been acknowledged in the respective commits or
issues on GitHub. We worked with the maintainers of said projects
to ensure mitigation of the problems reported in this paper.
To ensure the reproducibility of our work, and to provide the
community with a relevant sample of vulnerable enclave programs
for evaluating future attacks and defenses, we published all of our
attack code at https://github.com/jovanbulck/0xbadc0de.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
This section reviews enclave operation and TEE design, introduces
the trusted runtime libraries we analyzed in this work, and finally
summarizes related work on TEE memory corruption attacks.
2.1 Enclave entry and exit
TEE design. The mechanisms to interface with enclaves vary
depending on the underlying TEE being used. Figure 1 shows how,
from an architectural point of view, we distinguish two types of TEE
designs: those that rely on a single-address-space model (e.g., Intel
SGX [8] and Sancus [32]) vs. the ones that follow a two-world view
(e.g., ARM TrustZone [34] and Keystone [21]). In the former case,
enclaves are embedded in the address space of an unprivileged host
application. The processor orchestrates enclave entry/exit events,
and enforces that enclave memory can never be accessed from
outside the enclave. Since the trusted code inside the enclave is
allowed to freely access unprotected memory locations outside the
enclave, bulk input/output data transfers are supported by simply
passing pointers in the shared address space.
In the case of a two-world design, on the other hand, the CPU
is logically divided into a “normal world” and a “secure world”. A
privileged security monitor software layer acts as a bridge between
both worlds. The processor enforces that normal world code cannot
access secure world memory and resources, and may only call a
predefined entry point in the security monitor. Since the security
monitor has unrestricted access to memory of both worlds, an
explicit “world-shared memory” region can typically be setup to
pass data from the untrusted OS into the enclave (and vica versa).
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Figure 1: Enclave interactions in a single-address-space TEE
design (left) vs. two-world design (right). The software com-
ponents we study are bold, and the TCB is green (solid lines).
Enclave entry/exit. Given that the runtimes we studied focus
mainly on Intel SGX (cf. Section 3.2), we now describe ecall/ocall
and exception handling following SGX terminology [8]. Note that
other TEEs feature similar mechanisms, the key difference for a two-
world design being that some of the enclave entry/exit functionality
may be implemented in the privileged security monitor software
layer instead of in the processor.
In order to enter the enclave, the untrusted runtime executes the
eenter instruction, which switches the processor into enclave mode
and transfers execution to a predefined entry point in the enclave’s
Trusted Runtime System (TRTS). Any meta data information, in-
cluding the requested ecall interface function to be invoked, can
be passed as untrusted parameters in CPU registers. TRTS first san-
itizes CPU state and untrusted parameters before passing control
to the ecall function to be executed. Subsequently, TRTS issues an
eexit instruction to perform a synchronous enclave exit back to
the untrusted runtime, again passing any parameters through CPU
registers. The process for ocalls takes place in reverse order. When
the enclave application calls into TRTS to perform an ocall, the
trusted CPU context is first stored before switching to the untrusted
world, and restored on subsequent enclave re-entry.
When encountering interrupts or exceptions during enclaved
execution, the processor executes an Asynchronous Enclave eXit
(AEX) procedure. AEX first saves CPU state to a secure Save State
Area (SSA) memory location inside the enclave, before scrubbing
registers and handing control to the untrusted OS. The enclave can
subsequently be resumed through the eresume instruction. Alter-
natively, the untrusted runtime may optionally first call a special
ecall which allows the enclave’s TRTS to internally handle the
exception by inspecting and/or modifying the saved SSA state.
2.2 TEE shielding runtimes
Intel SGX-SDK. With the release of the open-source SGX-SDK,
Intel [19] supports a secure function call abstraction to enable pro-
duction enclave development in C/C++. Apart from pre-built trusted
runtime libraries, a key component of the SDK is the edger8r tool,
which parses a developer-provided Enclave Description Language
(EDL) file in order to automatically generate trusted and untrusted
proxy functions to be executed when crossing enclave boundaries.
Microsoft Open Enclave SDK. Microsoft developed the open-
source Open Enclave (OE) SDK with the purpose of facilitating
TEE-agnostic production enclave development [29]. Currently, OE
only supports Intel SGX applications, but in the future TrustZone-
based TEEs will also be supported through OP-TEE bindings [29].
The OE runtime includes a custom fork of Intel’s edger8r tool.
Google Asylo. Google aims to provide a higher-level, platform-
agnostic C++ API to develop production enclaves in a Remote Pro-
cedure Call (RPC)-like fashion [13]. While the Asylo specification
aims to generalize over multiple TEEs, presently only a single SGX
back-end is supported, which internally uses Intel’s SGX-SDK. From
a practical perspective, the Asylo runtime can thus be regarded as
an additional abstraction layer on top of the Intel SGX-SDK.
Fortanix Rust-EDP. As an alternative to Intel’s andMicrosoft’s
SDKs written in C/C++, Fortanix released a production-quality SGX
toolchain to develop enclaves in the safe Rust language [11]. The
combination of SGX’s isolation guarantees with Rust’s type sys-
tem aims to rule out memory safety attacks against the trusted
enclave code. Similar to libOS-based approaches, Rust-EDP hides
the enclave interface completely from the programmer and trans-
parently redirects all outside world interactions in the standard
library through a compact and scrutinized ocall interface.
Graphene-SGX. This open-source library OS approach allows
to run unmodified Linux binaries inside SGX enclaves [43]. The
trusted Graphene-SGX runtime transparently takes care of all en-
clave boundary interactions. For this, the libOS offers a limited
ecall interface to launch the application, and translates all system
calls made by the shielded application binary into untrusted ocalls.
While Graphene was originally developed as a research project, it
is currently meeting increasing industry adaption and thrives to
become a standard solution in the Intel SGX landscape [36].
SGX-LKL. This open-source research project offers a trusted
in-enclave library OS that allows to run unmodified Linux binaries
inside SGX enclaves [35]. Similarly to Graphene-SGX, SGX-LKL
intercepts all system calls in the shielded application binary, but the
libOS layer is internally based on the Linux Kernel Library (LKL).
Keystone. Keystone [21] is an open-source research framework
for developing customized TEEs in RISC-V processors. Keystone
adopts a “secure world” view similar to ARM TrustZone [34] where
a privileged security monitor software layer separates enclaves in
their own address spaces, potentially including explicit shared mem-
ory regions. Keystone enclaves feature a trusted runtime which in-
tercepts system calls and transparently tunnels all untrusted world
interactions through the underlying security monitor.
Sancus. The Sancus research TEE [32] offers lightweight en-
clave isolation and attestation on an embedded 16-bit TI MSP430
processor featuring a plain single-address-space without virtual
memory. A dedicated C compiler automates enclave creation and in-
cludes a small trusted runtime library that is transparently invoked
on enclave entry/exit. Trusted software may additionally provide
code confidentiality [14] or authentic execution [31] guarantees.
2.3 Related work
OS system call interface. During the last decade, significant
research efforts have been made to discover and mitigate vulnera-
bilities in OS kernels, such as missing pointer checks, uninitialized
data leakage, or buffer and integer overflows [6]. By exploiting
a single vulnerability in a kernel, unprivileged adversaries may
read or write arbitrary memory and gain root access. While these
vulnerabilities continue to be relevant in modern kernels, they are
generally well understood by the OS security community. However,
they have received less attention in the context of TEEs.
Checkoway et al. [4] first demonstrated that an untrusted OS can
perform so called Iago attacks to compromise legacy applications
by supplying maliciously crafted pointers or lengths as the return
value of a traditionally trusted system call like malloc(). These
attacks are closely related to a small subset of the vulnerabilities
described in this work, specifically attack vector #9, which exploits
that pointers or buffer sizes returned by untrusted ocalls may
not be properly sanitized (cf. Section 5.5). Our work generalizes
Iago attacks from the OS system call interface to ocalls in general,
and more broadly shows that Iago attacks are but one instance
of adversarial OS interactions. We show for instance that legacy
applications may also make implicit assumptions on the validity of
argv and envp pointers, which are not the result of system calls.
Memory corruption attacks on ARMTrustZone. ARM Trust-
Zone [34] was one of the first widely deployed TEEs, particularly
in mobile devices, and hence received considerable attention from
security researchers. The code running in the secure world largely
depends on the device manufacturer, with widely used runtimes
including Trustonic Kinibi, Qualcomm’s QSEE, Google’s Trusty,
and the open-source project OP-TEE. Over the past years, several
vulnerabilities [33, 34] have been discovered in TrustZone runtimes
caused by e.g., missing or incorrect pointer range or length checks,
or incorrect handling of integer arithmetic. Often, these vulnera-
bilities rely on the existence of a shared memory region for data
exchange between the normal and secure worlds: if an adversary
passes a pointer into trusted memory where a pointer to shared
memory is expected, memory corruption or disclosure may occur
when the pointer is not properly validated by the trusted runtime.
Machiry et al. [27] presented a related class of Boomerang attacks,
which leverage the fact that TrustZone’s secure world OS has full
access to untrusted memory, including the regions used by the
untrusted OS. Boomerang exploits that trusted pointer sanitization
logic may only validate that pointers lie outside of secure memory,
allowing unprivileged code executing in the normal world to read
or write memory locations belonging to other applications or the
untrusted OS. In a sense, Boomerang vulnerabilities are orthogonal
to a subset of the vulnerabilities described in this paper: both target
incorrect pointer checks within trusted code, but while Boomerang
attacks relate to checks of pointers into untrusted memory, we focus
on pointers into trusted memory.
Memory corruption attacks on Intel SGX. Lee et al. [22] were
the first to execute a completely blind memory corruption attack
against SGX by augmenting code reuse attack techniques [41] with
several side-channel oracles. To successfully mount this attack, ad-
versaries require kernel privileges and a static enclave memory lay-
out. Recently, these techniques were improved by Biondo et al. [3]
to allow even non-privileged adversaries to hijack vulnerable en-
claves in the presence of fine-grained address space randomiza-
tion [40]. Their approach is furthermore made application-agnostic
by leveraging gadgets found in the trusted runtime library of the
official Intel SGX-SDK. In a perpendicular line of research, Schwarz
et al. [38] criticized SGX’s design choice of providing enclaves with
unlimited access to untrusted memory outside the enclave. They
demonstrated that malware code executing inside an SGX enclave
can mount stealthy code reuse attacks to hijack control flow in the
untrusted host application.
Importantly, all previous SGX memory safety research focused
on contributing novel exploitation techniques while assuming the
prior presence of a vulnerability in the enclave code itself. Hence,
those results are complementary to the vulnerabilities described in
this work. We have indeed demonstrated control flow hijacking for
some of the pointer sanitization issues below, and these may further
benefit from exploitation techniques developed in prior work.
3 METHODOLOGY AND ADVERSARY MODEL
3.1 Attacker model
We consider systems with hardware support for a TEE and where
a trusted runtime supports the secure, shielded execution of an en-
claved binary produced by the application developer. With enclaved
binary, we specifically mean that the binary is the output of a stan-
dard compiler, which is not aware of the TEE. It is the responsibility
of the shielding runtime to preserve intended program semantics
in a hostile environment. We focus exclusively on vulnerabilities
in the TEE runtime and assume that there are no application-level
memory safety vulnerabilities in the enclaved binary.
We assume the standard TEE attacker model [28], where ad-
versaries have full control over all software executing outside the
hardware-protected memory region. This is a powerful attacker
model, allowing the adversary to, for instance, modify page table
entries [47, 54], or precisely execute the victim enclave one instruc-
tion at a time [45]; yet, this is the attacker that TEEs are designed
to defend against. It is important to note that some of the attacks
we discuss can also be launched by significantly less privileged
attackers, i.e., with just user-level privileges to invoke the enclave.
3.2 Research methodology
Our objective is to pinpoint enclave shielding responsibilities, and to
find vulnerabilities where real-world TEE runtimes fail to safeguard
implicit interface assumptions made by the enclaved binary.
TEE runtime code review. We base our research on manual
code review, and hence limited our study to open-source TEE run-
times. After reviewing the literature and code repositories, we
selected 8 popular runtimes to be audited. Our resulting selection
allows to compare tendencies in (i) production vs. research code
bases; (ii) SDK vs. libOS-based shielding abstractions; (iii) unsafe
C/C++ vs. safe Rust programming languages; and (iv) underly-
ing TEE design dependencies. Note that we opted not to include
baidu-rust-sgx, as it is merely a layer on top of Intel SGX-SDK (and
hence inherits all vulnerabilities of the latter). After reviewing prior
research [33] and relevant code, we found that sanitization in the
TrustZone runtime OP-TEE has already been thoroughly vetted
and we hence decided not to systematically audit this runtime. For
each of the selected TEE runtime implementations, we then re-
viewed the sanitizations and defensive checks implemented by the
trusted runtime between entering the TEE and transferring control
Table 1: Enclave runtime vulnerability assessment (our contribution, highlighted) and comparison to related work on OSs and
TEEs. Symbols indicate whether a vulnerability was successfully exploited (⋆); acknowledged but without proof-of-concept
( ); or not found to apply (#). Half-filled symbols (⋆,G#) indicate that improper sanitization only leads to side-channel leakage.
Vulnerability
Runtime
SGX
-SDK
Ope
nEn
clav
e
Grap
hene
SGX
-LKL
Rust
-EDP
Asyl
o
Keys
tone
Sanc
us
Linu
x Prior TEE attack research
#1 Entry status flags sanitization ⋆ ⋆ G#  G#  # # [9]
#2 Entry stack pointer restore # # ⋆  # # # ⋆ #Tier1(ABI) #3 Exit register leakage # # # ⋆ # # # # # SGX Dark-ROP exploitation [3, 22]
#4 Missing pointer range check # ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ #  # ⋆ [6] TrustZone exploits [33, 34]
#5 Null-terminated string handling ⋆ ⋆ # # # # # # [6]
#6 Integer overflow in range check # #  #  #   [6] TrustZone exploits [33, 34]
#7 Incorrect pointer range check # #  # #  #  #
#8 Double fetch untrusted pointer # #  # # # # # [37, 53] SGX AsyncShock framework [50]
#9 Ocall return value not checked # ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ #  ⋆ # – Iago attacks (Linux system call interface) [4]
Tier2
(API)
#10 Uninitialized padding leakage [23] ⋆ #  #  ⋆ ⋆ [7] SGX-SDK edger8r struct leakage [23]
to the enclaved binary, and the symmetrical path when exiting the
TEE. We found new vulnerabilities in all studied runtimes. Table 1
summarizes our findings, structured according to the respective
vulnerability classes, and relating to similar vulnerabilities in the
Linux kernel and prior TEE research. Our systematization revealed
10 distinct attack vectors across 2 subsequent tiers of TEE shielding
responsibilities, explored in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
In our code review, we focus our attention on the assumptions
that an enclaved binary makes about two key interfaces, and we
consider both integrity and confidentiality concerns. A first level of
interface sanitization we inspect is the ABI, which unambiguously
specifies function calling conventions regarding the low-level ma-
chine state expected by the compiler [10]. We manually locate the
trusted runtime entry point, and review how the compact assembly
routine establishes a trustworthy ABI state on entry, and similarly
scrubs residual CPU state on exit. The second key interface, that
we refer to as the API, is the functional interface of the enclaved
binary. We review how the TEE runtime validates different kinds
of arguments passed in through an ecall or as the return value
of an ocall. We focus in particular on the handling of pointers
and strings, where it is the TEE runtime’s responsibility to ensure
that variable-sized buffers lie entirely outside the enclave before
copying them inside and transferring execution to the enclaved
binary. For confidentiality, we check again that all memory copied
outside the TEE only contains explicit return values, and that no
avoidable side-channel leakage is introduced.
TEE design considerations. The communication between en-
clave and untrusted code for all TEE runtimes considered in this
paper relies on some form of “world-shared memory”, i.e., a mem-
ory region that is accessible to both trusted and untrusted code.
Depending on the specific TEE design (cf. Fig. 1), this can be re-
alized by either embedding the enclave in the address space of
a surrounding host process, as in Intel SGX [8] or Sancus [32],
or by explicitly mapping a dedicated virtual memory region into
both worlds as in ARM TrustZone [34] and Keystone [21]. Prior
research has mainly explored interface sanitization vulnerabilities
in ARM TrustZone TEEs (cf. Section 2.3). Given the prevalence of
SGX in contemporary Intel processors, our study focuses largely
on SGX-style single-address-space TEE designs as used in 7 out of 8
considered runtimes. However, the example of Keystone, and prior
research on ARM TrustZone [33, 34], shows that the attack surface
studied here is not necessarily limited to TEEs using the single-
address-space approach taken by SGX. As part of our analysis, we
found that certain TEE-specific design considerations may some-
times significantly impact exploitability. When applicable, such
TEE design considerations are discussed throughout the paper.
4 ESTABLISHING A TRUSTED ABI
Similarly to traditional user/kernel isolation, TEE-enabled proces-
sors typically only take care of switching to a fixed entry point
and thereafter leave it up to trusted runtime software to securely
bootstrap the enclaved execution. In practice, this implies that ad-
versaries may still control a large fraction of the low-level machine
state (e.g., CPU registers) on enclave entry. Hence, a trusted as-
sembly entry routine is responsible to establish an ABI-compliant
machine state when transferring control to the shielded application,
and to save and scrub low-level machine state on enclave exit.
4.1 Sanitizing machine state on entry
After reviewingwell-documentedABI-level calling conventions [10]
expected by popular C compilers, we concluded that most CPU reg-
isters can be left unmodified, apart from the stack pointer explored
in the next section. However, a more subtle concern relates to the
expected state of certain status register flags on function entry.
Attack vector #1 (status flags): Entry code should sanitize register flags
that may adversely impact program execution. ▷ Prevalent in production
and research runtimes, but exclusively Intel SGX (x86 CISC).
TEE design. The underlying processor architecture used in the
specific TEE design may greatly impact the resulting ABI-level at-
tack surface. That is, in comparison to Intel’s notoriously complex
x86 CISC architecture [8], simpler RISC-based TEEs such as San-
cus [32], Keystone [21], or ARM TrustZone [34] tend to impose less
obligations for trusted software to sanitize low-level machine state.
For instance, we found that the Sancus runtime should only take
care to clear the interrupt flag. Likewise, TrustZone even transpar-
ently takes care to save/restore secure world stack pointer registers.
Our analysis further reveals the trade-offs for implementing register
and status flag clearing in either hardware or software. For instance,
we show that the Intel SGX design leaves this responsibility largely
to software, exposing a larger attack surface.
We methodically examined all the software-visible flags in the
x86 flags register [17] and discovered two potentially dangerous
flags that may adversely impact enclaved execution if not properly
cleared. First, the Alignment Check (AC) flag may be set before
entering the enclave in order to be deterministically notified of
every unaligned memory access performed by the trusted enclave
software. This novel side-channel attack vector is closely related to
well known page fault [54] or segmentation fault [15] controlled-
channels, but this time abuses x86 #AC alignment-check exceptions.
Also, note that #PF side-channels ultimately reflect fundamental
hardware-level TEE design decisions that cannot be avoided in soft-
ware, whereas we argue that #AC leakage originates from the trusted
runtime’s failure to clear the associated status register control flag.
A second and more dangerous ABI-level attack vector arises from
the Direction Flag (DF), which can be set to change the loop behav-
ior of x86 string instructions (e.g., rep movs) from auto-increment to
auto-decrement. Commonly used x86 ABIs [10] allow for compiler
optimizations by mandating that DF shall always be cleared on func-
tion call/return. However, in case this subtle ABI requirement is not
explicitly enforced in the assembly entry routine, SGX adversaries
may change DF to an unexpected “decrement” direction before the
ecall and thereby hijack the intended direction of all subsequent
x86 string instructions executed by the enclave. This opens a severe
vulnerability that can be successfully exploited to trigger enclave
memory corruption and erroneous computation results.
Intel SGX-SDK. We experimentally confirmed that the trusted
runtime in Intel’s official SGX-SDK [19] does not clear AC or DF on
enclave entry. The latter can be tracked via CVE-2019-14565 (Intel
SA-00293), leading to enclave TCB recovery.
While unaligned data accesses (e.g., fetching a 16-bit word at an
odd byte address) are explicitly supported in the x86 architecture,
the processor may optionally be forced to generate an exception
for such accesses when software sets the AC bit in the flags reg-
ister. We developed a minimal sample enclave to showcase how
#AC exceptions may in certain scenarios reveal secret-dependent
data accesses at an enhanced byte-level granularity as compared
to state-of-the-art SGX side-channel attacks that are restricted to a
coarser-grained 64 B cacheline [39] or 4 KiB page-level [47, 54] gran-
ularity. Figure 2 illustrates the key idea behind the attack, where
a 16-bit word is loaded by specifying a byte-granular index in a
small lookup table that has been explicitly aligned to a cacheline
boundary (e.g., as might also be performed in a streamed data or
string processing enclave application). In the example, secret index
0 returns the data AB, whereas secret index 1 returns BC. Our exploit
deterministically reconstructs the intra-cacheline secret-dependent
data access by observing whether or not the enclaved execution
generates an #AC alignment-check exception. One of the challenges
we encountered is to make the enclave progress after returning
from the untrusted signal handler. Since the processor automati-
cally restores the previous value of the flags register (including
the set AC bit) from enclave-private SSA memory when resuming
the enclave [8], the unaligned data access will never be allowed to
unaligned data access #AC exception
64B cacheline   A B D
index (secret)
C
Figure 2: Misaligned, intra-cacheline secret data access.
complete. To overcome this challenge, we make use of the adver-
sary’s root privileges to load a simple kernel module that clears the
processor’s Alignment Mask (CR0.AM) to temporarily disable align-
ment checking. Combined with a single-stepping attack primitive
like SGX-Step [45], this approach allows to determine noise-free
alignment side-channel information for every single instruction in
the victim enclave.
It should be noted that the oversight of not clearing the AC flag
in the trusted runtime merely leaks address-related side-channel
information, which falls explicitly outside of SGX’s threat model [8].
However, this is distinctly not the case for the DF flag, which di-
rectly intervenes with the semantics of the enclaved execution. We
confirmed that the popular gcc v5.4 compiler replaces for instance
common strlen() and memset() invocations with inlined x86 string
instructions at optimization level -Os. We developed a start-to-end
attack scenario to show how forcibly inverting the direction of such
string operations when entering the enclave through an ecall can
lead to controlled heap corruption and memory disclosure. Our
PoC exploit targets edger8r bridge code that is automatically gen-
erated to copy input and output buffers to and from the enclave
(cf. Section 5.1 and Fig. 3). Particularly, we abuse that edger8r code
allocates the output buffers on the enclave heap and thereafter uses
memset() to securely initialize the newly allocated buffer to all-zero.
However, setting DF before the ecall causes the memset() direction
to be inverted and any preceding heap memory to be corrupted (i.e.,
zeroed). Due to the way the SGX-SDK enclave heap is organized,
this will ultimately lead to a crash on the next free() invocation in
the edger8r code. Every heap frame is preceded by a size field and
a pointer to a meta-data bookkeeping structure. Such pointers are
stored in xor-ed form with a randomly generated secret constant
to harden the code against traditional heap corruption attacks. We
confirmed that after erroneously zeroing the preceding heap frames,
the resulting pointer will most likely end up as a non-canonical
64-bit address and halt the enclave by means of a general protec-
tion fault. However, before finally calling free() and detecting the
heap corruption, the trusted edger8r-generated code still copies the
allocated output buffer outside the enclave, potentially leading to
secret disclosure (as this buffer has never been properly zeroed).
We note that the heap corruption in itself may also be leveraged in
application-specific scenarios, e.g., zeroing out a cryptographic key
residing in the preceding heap frame.
Microsoft Open Enclave SDK. We experimentally confirmed
that OE suffers from the same DF vulnerability described above
(tracked via CVE-2019-1370). However, we found that after enter-
ing the enclave with the DF flag set, the trusted runtime already
crashes early-on in the entry path. The reason for this is that on
our machines (gcc v5.4 using the default Makefile), one of the
compiled entry functions uses a rep string instruction to initialize a
local variable on the call stack. Hence, setting DF leads to memory
1 cmp $RETURN_FROM_OCALL , %rdi ; %RDI = attacker arg
2 je .Lreturn_from_ocall
3 ...
4 .Lreturn_from_ocall
5 ⭑ mov %gs:SGX_LAST_STACK , %rsp
6 ...
7 ret
Listing 1: Low-level ocall return path in Graphene-SGX.
corruption by overwriting a piece of the trusted call stack with
zeroes. We have not attempted to further exploit this behavior.
Other SGX runtimes. When reviewing the assembly entry rou-
tines of the other SGX-based shielding systems (cf. Table 1), we
found that none of them sanitizes AC, whereas interestingly both
Rust-EDP and Graphene-SGX clear DF on enclave entry. Note that
Google’s Asylo framework is built on top of the Intel SGX-SDK and
hence inherits all of the vulnerabilities described above.
4.2 Maintaining the call stack abstraction
In order to safeguard enclave confidentiality and integrity, it is
essential that enclaves features their own private call stack. When
exiting the TEE by means of an ocall, the trusted stack pointer
should be stored and control flow should continue at a location
outside the enclave. After having performed an ocall, upon receiv-
ing the next ecall, the private call stack should be restored so the
runtime can “return” into the shielded application.
Attack vector #2 (call stack): Entry code should safeguard the call stack
abstraction for ecalls and ocalls. ▷ Not applicable to TrustZone, well-
understood in production SGX-SDKs, but not always in research code.
TEE design. We observed that TEE-specific design decisions
may largely impact the attack surface arising from call stack switch-
ing. That is, in ARMTrustZone [34] the stack pointer CPU register is
duplicated and fully transparently stored/restored on secure world
context switches. More versatile TEE designs like Intel SGX [8]
or Sancus [32], on the other hand, support multiple mutually dis-
trusting enclaves and leave it up to trusted runtime software to
store and restore the stack pointer across enclave boundaries. An-
other illustration of the trade-offs between hardware and software
responsibilities arises in SGX’s eexit instruction, which was de-
signed to explicitly fault when supplying in-enclave continuation
addresses [8]. Alternative TEE designs like Sancus [32], on the other
hand, expect such continuation pointer checks to be performed by
the trusted software, leaving a larger attack surface.
Graphene-SGX. After scrutinizing Graphene’s low-level boot-
strapping code, we discovered that enclave_entry.S does not prop-
erly safeguard the ocall return abstraction. Listing 1 shows how
the code unconditionally jumps to the stack pointer restore logic
after merely receiving an unchecked magic value in the %rdi register.
We experimentally confirmed that this can be abused to illegally
“return” into an enclave thread that is not waiting for a previous
ocall return. An adversary can exploit this weakness to erroneously
initialize the trusted in-enclave stack pointer of a newly started
thread with the value of the last ocall. The memory content at
these locations determine the values popped into registers, and
ultimately ret control flow.
SGX-LKL. We found a highly similar vulnerability in the way
SGX-LKL’s low-level entry code distinguishes different ecall types.
Specifically, we noticed that the unchecked parameter in %rdi can be
poisoned to trick the entry routine into erroneously calling a signal
handler for a thread that was never interrupted. This is especially
problematic as the signal handler code will then illegally restore
the stack pointer register from an uninitialized memory location.
Sancus. We reviewed the assembly code inserted at the entry
point of a Sancus enclave, and noticed that the Sancus TEE suffers
from similar call stack switching vulnerabilities. Particularly, we
experimentally confirmed that it is possible to supply illegal CPU
register arguments and trick the enclave into “returning” into a
thread that was not waiting for a previous ocall return. In such a
case, the enclave stack will be falsely restored to the value of the
last valid ocall, leading to memory-safety violations from incorrect
control flow and register values. Sancus’s enclave entry assembly
routine further expects a CPU register parameter to specify the
address where execution is continued after leaving the enclave. The
software does not properly validate this parameter. Unlike SGX’s
eexit hardware primitive, which refuses to jump to illegal continu-
ation addresses, Sancus enclaves are exited by means of an ordinary
jmp instruction. We experimentally confirmed the possibility of
code reuse attacks [41] by forcing the vulnerable entry routine to
jump to an arbitrary in-enclave continuation address.
4.3 Storing and scrubbing machine state on exit
Prior to exiting the TEE, the trusted runtime’s assembly routine
should save and clear all CPU registers that are not part of the
calling convention, and restore them on subsequent enclave re-
entry. This is highly similar to how a traditional operating system
needs to context switch between processes, and hence we found
this to be a generally well-understood requirement.
Attack vector #3 (register state): Exit code should save and scrub CPU
registers. ▷ Generally well-understood across runtimes and architectures.
TEE design. Similar to parameter passing across traditional
user/kernel boundaries, widespread TEE designs commonly pre-
serve CPU register contents when context switching between the
normal and secure worlds. Prior research [3, 22] on exploiting mem-
ory safety vulnerabilities in SGX enclaves has for instance exploited
that the eexit instruction does not clear register values, leaving this
as an explicit software responsibility. Further, while scrubbing CPU
registers on enclave interrupt is a hardware responsibility in the In-
tel SGX design [8], we found that the AEX operation in current SGX
processors does not clear the x86 DF flag (cf. Section 4.1). We ex-
perimentally confirmed that this can be exploited as a side-channel
to learn the direction of private in-enclave string operations.
SGX-LKL. When reviewing the respective assembly routines,
we noticed that SGX-LKL is the only SGX runtime which does not
properly scrub registers before invoking eexit. The reason for this
oversight is that LKL attempts to leverage the setjmp/longjmp stan-
dard C library functions to easily store and restore the execution
state on enclave entry/exit without needing dedicated assembly
code. While indeed functionally correct, i.e., the integrity of CPU
registers is preserved across enclave calls, the approach cannot
guarantee confidentiality. This is because setjmp() still behaves
as a normal C function, which—adhering to calling conventions—
does not clear all CPU state. We therefore advise to use a dedicated
assembly routine which overwrites confidential CPU registers be-
fore invoking eexit. This issue highlights the necessity to explicate
and properly separate ABI and API-level shielding concerns in
consecutive stages of the trusted runtime (cf. Section 3). We exper-
imentally confirmed this vulnerability by loading an elementary
AES-NI application binary inside SGX-LKL, and modifying the un-
trusted runtime to dump x86 xmm registers—including the AES state
and round keys—after enclave exit.
5 SANITIZING THE ENCLAVE API
Once a trustworthy ABI state has been established, the trusted
bootstrapping assembly code can safely transfer control to ma-
chine code emitted by a compiler from a program description
written in a higher-level language. Remarkably, almost all run-
times [13, 19, 21, 29, 32, 35, 43] we studied are written in C or C++,
with the notable exception of Fortanix’s EDP platform [11], which
is written in the memory-safe Rust language. While the use of safe
languages is indeed preferable to rule out an important class of
application-level memory-safety vulnerabilities in the trusted run-
time implementation, we show that safe languages by themselves
cannot guarantee that the enclave interface is safe.
That is, it remains the responsibility of the trusted runtime im-
plementation to marshal and scrutinize untrusted input parameters
before passing them on to the shielded application written by the
enclave developer. Depending on the specific runtime, develop-
ers may communicate trusted API sanitization and marshalling
requirements explicitly (e.g., using a domain-specific language like
in Intel’s edger8r or Microsoft’s oeedger8r), or the enclave interface
may be completely hidden from the programmer (e.g., libOS-based
approaches).
In this section, we analyze shielding requirements for API san-
itization based on the different types of arguments that can be
passed across the enclave boundary. We pay particular attention
to pointers and (variable-sized) input buffers, given the prevalent
weaknesses found in real-world code.
5.1 Validating pointer arguments
Whenever untrusted side and enclave share at least part of their
address spaces, an important new attack surface arises: malicious
(untrusted) code can pass in a pointer to enclave memory where a
pointer to untrusted memory is expected. Therefore, it is the respon-
sibility of the shielding system to be careful in never dereferencing
untrusted input pointers that fall outside of the shared memory
region and point into the enclave. In case such sanity checks are
missing, the trusted enclave software may unintentionally disclose
and/or corrupt enclave memory locations. This is an instance of the
well-known “confused deputy” [16] security problem: the attacker
is architecturally prohibited from accessing secure enclave mem-
ory, but tricks a more privileged enclaved program to inadvertently
dereference a secure memory location chosen by the attacker.
Attack vector #4 (pointers): Runtimes should sanitize input pointers to
lie inside the expected shared memory region. ▷ Generally understood,
but critical oversights prevalent across research and production code.
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Figure 3: Automatically generated edger8r bridge code han-
dles shielding of application input and output buffers.
TEE design. TEEs commonly support some form of sharedmem-
ory which allows trusted in-enclave code to directly read or write
an untrusted memory region outside the enclave (cf. Section 3.2).
Input and output data transfers can now easily be achieved by
bulk-copying into the shared memory region and passing pointers.
Pointer sanitization is a relatively well-known requirement for
enclave applications, and even bears some similarity with tradi-
tional user-to-kernel system call validation concerns [6]. However,
the kernel system call interface remains largely invisible, fairly
stable, and is only modified by a select group of expert developers.
SDK-based enclave development frameworks on the other hand
expose ecalls and ocalls much more directly to the application
developer by means of a secure function call abstraction.
Intel SGX-SDK. In line with trusted runtime shielding require-
ments, pointer sanitization should preferably not be left to the
application developer’s end responsibility. As part of the official
SGX-SDK, Intel [19] therefore developed a convenient tool called
edger8r, which transparently generates trusted proxy bridge code
to take care of validating pointer arguments and copying input and
output buffers to/from the enclave. The tool automatically gener-
ates C code based on ecall/ocall function prototypes and explicit
programmer annotations that specify pointer directions and sizes
in a custom, domain-specific Enclave Definition Language (EDL).
Figure 3 gives an overview of the high-level operation of the
trusted edger8r bridge code. After entering the enclave, the trusted
runtime establishes a trusted ABI (cf. Section 4), locates the ecall
function to be called, and finally 1○ hands over control to the
corresponding edger8r-generated bridge code. At this point, all
input buffer pointers are validated to fall completely outside the
enclave, before being copied 2○ from untrusted shared memory to
a sufficiently-sized shadow buffer allocated on the enclave heap. Fi-
nally, the edger8r bridge transfers control 3○ to the code written by
the application developer, which can now safely operate 4○ on the
cloned buffer in enclave memory. A symmetrical path is followed
when returning or performing ocalls to the untrusted code outside
the enclave.
Microsoft Open Enclave SDK. Microsoft [29] adopted the san-
itization strategy from the Intel SGX-SDK by means of their own
oeedger8r fork. Interestingly, OE uses a “deep copy” marshalling
scheme to generalize to TEEs where the enclave cannot directly
access host memory and every interaction needs to be mediated in
a security kernel with access to an explicit shared memory region
(cf. Fig. 1). With deep copy marshalling, instead of passing the en-
clave pointers to the input buffer, the contents of the buffer are first
1 OE_ECALL void ecall_hello(hello_args_t* p_host_args) {
2 oe_result_t __result = OE_FAILURE;
3 if (! p_host_args || !oe_is_outside_enclave(p_host_args ,
4 sizeof (* p_host_args)))
5 goto done;
6 ...
7 done:
8 ⭑ if (p_host_args) p_host_args ->_result = __result;
9 }
Listing 2: Proxy function generated by oeedger8r (simplified)
with illegal write to arbitrary in-enclave pointer on failure.
copied into the marshalling structure and then cloned into enclave
memory. The pointers in the argument structure are then modified
such that they point to the corresponding (cloned) memory buffer.
Nevertheless, we discovered several flaws in the way OE handles
pointer validation (tracked via CVE-2019-0876). A first subtle issue
was found by reviewing the oeedger8r-generated code skeleton
itself. Listing 2 shows a simplified snippet of the trusted bridge
code generated for an elementary hello() entry point. The code
attempts to properly verify that the untrusted p_host_args structure
lies outside the enclave, and indeed rejects the ecallwhen detecting
a pointer poisoning attempt. However, in the done branch at line 8,
an error code is still written into the p_host_args structure, even
if it was found earlier to illegally point inside the enclave. At the
time of our review, this could only be exploited when calling the
enclave through a legacy ecall dispatcher that had unfortunately
not been removed from OE’s trusted code base (cf. Appendix A.1).
Secondly, we found that enclaves built with OE feature a small
number of “built-in” ecall entry points for infrastructural function-
ality directly serviced in the trusted runtime without forwarding
to the shielded application. Notably, OE developers decided not to
route these entry points through oeedger8r-generated bridges, but
instead opted to manually scrutinize arguments for these special
ecalls. We audited all eight built-in entry points, and confirmed
that most of themwere carefully written to prevent pointer sanitiza-
tion issues, as well as more subtle attack vectors like TOCTOU and
speculative execution side-channels. However, we found a critical
issue in the built-in _handle_get_sgx_report() ecall involved in
crucial attestation functionality (see Appendix A.2 for full code).
This function copies the untrusted report input buffer into enclave
memory, but never validates whether the argument pointer passed
by the untrusted runtime actually lies outside the enclave. This
evidently leads to corruption of trusted memory, e.g., when writing
the return value in the fall-through branch similar to the oeedger8r-
generated code discussed above.
Both of the above vulnerabilities allow to write a fixed fail-
ure code (0x03000000 and 0x01000000) to an arbitrary in-enclave
memory location. We developed a PoC based on an existing file-
encryptor OE example application, and successfully exploited the
above vulnerabilities to forcefully overwrite the first round keys of
the AES cipher. This could be extended by overwriting all but the
final round keys with known values to perform full key extraction.
Google Asylo. Because Google’s Asylo [13] framework is built
on top the existing Intel SGX-SDK, it also inherits Intel’s edger8r-
based input sanitization scheme. Particularly, the Asylo trusted
runtime features a small number of predefined ecall entry points,
specified in EDL, that implement the necessary functionality to
present a higher-level, RPC-like message passing abstraction to the
application programmer. Considering that Asylo’s runtime extends
the trusted computing base on top of Intel’s existing SGX-SDK, we
were interested to assess whether the extra abstraction level may
also bring additional attack surface. This may for instance be the
casewhenmaking use of the unsafe [user_check] EDL attribute [19]
that explicitly weakens edger8r guarantees and puts the burden of
pointer validation on the programmer (e.g., to allow for application-
specific optimizations in performance-critical scenarios). Manually
scrutinizing the EDL specifications of Asylo’s trusted runtime, we
found 14 instances of the problematic [user_check] attribute. We
reviewed these instances and alarmingly found that several of them
lacked proper pointer validation, leaving critical vulnerabilities in
the compiled enclave (e.g., a write-zero primitive). Notably, the
developers took care to validate second-level input buffers in the
untrusted argument structure, but failed to validate the argument
pointer itself (cf. Appendix A.3 for a relevant sample).
Graphene-SGX. While Graphene-SGX’s [43] untrusted world
interaction and pointer validation concerns are largely limited to
ocalls (cf. Sections 5.3 and 5.5), our inspection of the narrow ecall
interface revealed a rather subtle type of implicit pointer passing
that was overlooked. Namely, Graphene’s trusted runtime never
validates the argv and envp pointers, which are passed from the
untrusted runtime all the way into the main function of the shielded
application binary. As a result, adversaries can for instance leak
arbitrary in-enclave memory when the trusted application outputs
argv values (e.g., in case of an unknown command line argument).
We experimentally confirmed this attack by means of an elemen-
tary echo program, which unknowingly prints in-enclave secrets
after overriding argv[1] in the untrusted runtime. With respect to
mitigations, note that properly sanitizing string arguments can be
non-trivial in itself, as explored in Section 5.2.
We also found that the special enclave_ecall_thread_start()
trusted runtime function unconditionally redirects control flow,
without performing any validation on the provided untrusted func-
tion pointer. We successfully exploited this to jump to arbitrary
in-enclave locations, hence allowing code reuse attacks [41].
SGX-LKL. Our analysis of the open-source SGX-LKL ecall in-
terface revealed the exact same vulnerability. That is, the trusted __s
gx_init_enclave() libOS function passes the untrusted argv pointer
directly to the shielded application without any prior sanitization.
We experimentally confirmed that this vulnerability can be abused
for information leakage, similar to the above exploit.
Further, the in-enclave signal handler ecall entry point does not
check that the siginfo struct pointer provided by the untrusted
runtime lies outside the enclave. This vulnerability can be abused in
certain scenarios to leak in-enclave memory contents. For instance,
we describe a full exploit for the SIGILL signal in Appendix A.4.
Sancus. To demonstrate that untrusted pointer dereference vul-
nerabilities are not limited to advanced virtual memory-based archi-
tectures, we also reviewed the trusted runtime and infrastructural
enclaves of the low-end open-source Sancus [32] TEE for embedded
TI MSP430 devices. As with the above runtimes, we focused our
security audit on the enclave boundary code only.
A first critical vulnerability was found in a recent extension [31]
to the Sancus compiler infrastructure, which implements a high-
level authenticated message passing abstraction to develop dis-
tributed event-driven enclave programs. Much like Intel’s edger8r,
the Sancus compiler fully automatically generates ecall bridge code
to transparently marshal, decrypt, and authenticate input buffers,
which can be subsequently processed by the shielded application.
We found that the compiler-generated bridge code does not sani-
tize untrusted pointer arguments (cf. Appendix A.5). This may be
exploited to forcefully decrypt enclave secrets.
A second input pointer validation vulnerability was found in
an infrastructural trusted loader enclave [14] that decrypts third-
party application enclaves to preserve code confidentiality. We
noticed that the trusted loader enclave code lacks any input pointer
validation checks, allowing us to build an arbitrary write primitive
in enclave memory. We successfully exploited this vulnerability in
a PoC that launches a ROP-style [41] control flow hijacking attack
by corrupting the loader enclave call stack.
5.2 Validating string arguments
In case the enclave interface is written in a low-level language like
C, string arguments do not carry an explicit length and may not
even have been properly null-terminated. Thus, shielding runtimes
need to first determine the expected length and always include a
null terminator when copying the string inside the enclave.
Attack vector #5 (strings): Runtimes should avoid computing untrusted
string sizes, and always include a null byte at the expected end. ▷ At least
one related instance repeated across two production SDKs.
TEE design. We show below how computing on unchecked
string pointers may leak enclave secrets through side-channels,
even if the ecall is eventually rejected. While side-channels are
generally a known issue across TEE technologies [8, 21, 34, 46] and
may even be observed by non-privileged adversaries, for example
by measuring overall execution time [30] or attacker-induced cache
evictions [26, 39], we show that TEE-specific design decisions can
still largely affect the overall exploitability of subtle side-channel
vulnerabilities. Particularly, we develop a highly practical attack
that abuses several privileged adversary capabilities that have previ-
ously been proven notorious in the Intel SGX design, e.g., untrusted
page tables [47, 54], interrupts [24, 45, 46], and storing interrupted
CPU register contents in SSA memory frames [5, 44].
Intel SGX-SDK. We discovered that edger8r-generated code
may be tricked into operating on unchecked in-enclave pointers
when computing the size of a variable-length input buffer. While
such illegal ecall attempts will always be properly rejected, we
found that adversaries can exploit the unintended size computa-
tion as a deterministic oracle that reveals side-channel information
about arbitrary in-enclave memory locations. This vulnerability is
tracked via CVE-2018-3626 (Intel SA-00117), leading to enclave TCB
recovery and changes in the EDL specification [18]. Prior to our dis-
closure, EDL allowed programmers to specify a custom [sizefunc]
attribute that takes as an argument an unchecked pointer to an
application-specific structure, and returns its size. Likewise, there
is a dedicated [string] EDL attribute to specify null-terminated
1 static sgx_status_t SGX_CDECL sgx_my_ecall(void* pms)
2 {
3 CHECK_REF_POINTER(pms , sizeof(ms_my_ecall_t));
4 ms_my_ecall_t* ms = SGX_CAST(ms_my_ecall_t*, pms);
5 char* _tmp_s = ms->ms_s;
6
7 ⭑ size_t _len_s = _tmp_s ? strlen(_tmp_s) + 1 : 0;
8 char* _in_s = NULL;
9
10 CHECK_UNIQUE_POINTER(_tmp_s , _len_s);
11 __builtin_ia32_lfence (); // fence after pointer checks
12 ...
Listing 3: Proxy function generated by edger8r for the EDL
specification: public void my_ecall([in,string] char *s).
string arguments. Essentially, this special case comes down to
[sizefunc=strlen].
Consider the code skeleton generated by edger8r in Listing 3
for an ecall that expects a single string pointer argument. In or-
der to verify that the complete string is outside the enclave, the
trusted edge routine first computes the size of the argument buffer
(through either strlen() or a dedicated sizefunc in general), and
only thereafter checks whether the entire buffer falls outside of the
enclave. It is intended that the edge code first determines the length
in untrusted memory, but we made the crucial observation that the
strlen() invocation at line 7 operates on an arbitrary unchecked
pointer, potentially pointing into enclave memory. Any pointer
poisoning attempts will subsequently be rejected at line 10, but
the unintended computation may have already leaked information
through various side-channels [24, 45]. In general, leakage occurs
whenever there is secret-dependent control or data flow in the
specified sizefunc. This is most obviously the case for the common
[string] EDL attribute, since the amount of loop operations per-
formed by strlen() reveals the number of non-zero bytes following
the specified in-enclave pointer.
Our attack builds on top of the open-source SGX-Step [45] en-
clave interrupt framework to turn the subtle strlen() side-channel
leakage into a fully deterministic oracle that reveals the exact po-
sition of all 0x00 bytes in enclave private memory (thereby for
instance fully breaking the confidentiality of booleans or providing
valuable information for cryptanalysis). Particularly, we use SGX-
Step to reliably step the strlen() execution, one instruction at a
time, leveraging the “accessed” bit in the page table entry of the
targeted in-enclave memory location as a noise-free oracle that is
deterministically set by the processor for every strlen() loop itera-
tion [47]. We confirmed that our single-stepping oracle continues to
work reliably even when the victim enclave was compiled to a sin-
gle, extremely compact rep movsb instruction (x86 string operations
can indeed be interrupted in between every loop iteration [17]).
We developed a practical end-to-end AES-NI key extraction PoC
in an application enclave built with a vulnerable version of edger8r.
Our victim enclave provides a single, multi-threaded ecall entry
point that encrypts the first 16 bytes of a given string using side-
channel resistant AES-NI instructions with a secret in-enclave key.
Since AES-NI operates exclusively on CPU registers (e.g., xmm0) and
due to the limited nature of the strlen() side-channel, we cannot
perform key extraction by directly targeting the AES state or key
in memory. Instead, our attack uses repeated encryption ecalls,
assuming varying (but not necessarily known) plaintext and known
Enclave
IRQ1
encryptString(){
		aesenc	k[8],	%xmm0
		aesenc	k[9],	%xmm0
		//Interruption
		aesenclast	k[10],%xmm0
}
SSA
Thread A
THREAD A
THREAD B
4 Ecall (SSA_frame+ XMM0_OFFSET)
2 AEX Thread A
Host Application
Edger8r
Ecall(msg){
		...
		strlen(msg)
}
Ecall (message)
SSA
Thread B
5 AEX Thread B3
Conﬁg
timer
6 Check accessed bit
Hardware
Figure 4: Overview of the key extraction attack exploiting
strlen() side-channel leakage in Intel SGX-SDK.
ciphertext. We further abuse that the Intel SGX architecture enables
a privileged adversary to precisely interrupt a victim enclave at
a chosen instruction-level granularity [45], thereby forcing the
processor to write the register state to a fixed SSA location in
enclave memory (this includes the xmm registers that are part of
the XSAVE region of the SSA frame). Figure 4 depicts the high-level
phases of the attack flow, using two threads A and B:
(a) Invoke the encryption ecall from thread A 1○ and interrupt
the enclave 2○ before the final round of the AES (i.e., before the
aesenclast instruction). To keep the PoC simple, we achieve this
requirement by inserting an access to a dummy page at the ap-
propriate point, and catching accesses to this page in a signal
handler on the untrusted side. Note that in a real-world attack,
the single-stepping feature of SGX-Step could be used to execute
the victim enclave exactly up to this point, without relying on a
more coarse-grained page fault for interruption.
(b) While the ecall in thread A is interrupted, prepare the timer
used by SGX-Step 3○ and launch a second thread B 4○ to probe
the position of the first zero byte (if any) in the intermediate AES
state. Concretely, this involves a second ecall to the same entry
point, but this time supplying an illegal in-enclave target address
pointing to the fixed memory location containing the xmm0 register
in the SSA frame of the interrupted thread A. Each time when a
timer interrupt arrives 5○, we monitor and clear 6○ the “accessed”
bit of the targeted SSA page table entry.
(c) After the strlen() probing has finished, the obtained leakage
is stored alongside the corresponding ciphertext, and thread A is
resumed by restoring read/write access to the dummy page.
(d) Repeat from step (a) with a different plaintext until the full key
has been recovered (see Algorithm 1).
Experimentally, we determined that this attack succeeds with
881 AES invocations on average (over 1000 runs with random keys,
minimum: 306, maximum: 3346), given a deterministic, noise-free
strlen() oracle. Note that this attack could also be adapted to work
with noisy measurements, using the so-called zero-value model
known from hardware side-channel attacks [12]. Besides, the attack
would also be applicable when targeting the first round of the AES
in a known-plaintext scenario.
Properly closing this side-channel requires profound changes in
the way edger8rworks. Notably, the bridge code includes an lfence
instruction at line 11 to rule out advanced Spectre-v1 misspecula-
tion attacks that might still speculatively compute on unchecked
Algorithm 1 strlen() oracle AES key recovery where S (⋅) denotes the
AES SBox and SR (p) the position of byte p after AES ShiftRows.
while not full key K recovered do(P ,C , L)← random plaintext, associated ciphertext, strlen oracle
if L < 16 then
K [SR (L)]← C [SR(L)]⊕ S (0)
end if
end while
pointers before they are architecturally rejected. However, our
attack is immune to such countermeasures because we directly
observe side effects of normal, non-speculative execution. Further,
early rejecting the ecall when detecting that the start pointer falls
inside the enclave does not suffice in general. In such a case, adver-
saries might still pass pointers below the enclave base address, and
observe secret-dependent behavior based on the first bytes of the
enclave. Intel implemented our recommended mitigation strategy
by dropping support for the superfluous [sizefunc] EDL attribute
entirely, and further abstaining from computing untrusted buffer
sizes inside the enclave. Instead, alleged buffer sizes are computed
outside the enclave, and passed as an untrusted argument, such that
the CHECK_UNIQUE_POINTER test can take place immediately. For the
strlen() case, the untrusted memory can simply be copied inside,
and an extra null byte inserted at the alleged end. This solution con-
veniently moves all secret-dependent control flow from the enclave
into the untrusted application context.
Microsoft Open Enclave SDK. After Intel had properly patched
the strlen() side-channel vulnerability in the SGX-SDK, OE ap-
pears to have tried to adopt our proposed mitigation strategy of
passing an untrusted alleged string length into the enclave. How-
ever, after reviewing the generated code, we found that oeedger8r
fails to include a 0x00 terminator byte after copying the untrusted
string inside enclave memory (cf. Appendix A.6). This critical over-
sight can be exploited to trick the shielded enclave application into
operating on non-null-terminated strings. The trusted user function
will incorrectly assume that the string is properly terminated and
may perform out-of-bounds memory read/writes, hence turning a
mitigation for a subtle and functionally correct side-channel issue
into a more dangerous source of enclave memory corruption. This
OE vulnerability is tracked via CVE-2019-0876 and specific to en-
claves that expect EDL string arguments, and output or manipulate
them in-place (e.g., strcpy()).
We experimentally demonstrated this vulnerability by means
of a minimal PoC application enclave which overwrites all non-
alphanumeric chars in a string with 0x20, until the null terminator
is encountered. If this enclave operates on an unterminated string,
the length field of the subsequent heap frame is corrupted, which
subsequently can be further leveraged in more complex exploits.
5.3 Validating variable-sized buffers
Multi-byte input buffers are commonly specified by passing a pointer
to the start of the buffer and an associated size. In order to properly
validate such buffers, the trusted runtime should first compute the
end pointer by adding the alleged size argument, and thereafter
assert that the complete input buffer address range falls outside the
enclave. However, since the buffer size is an adversary-controlled
parameter, care should be taken to prevent the pointer addition
from overflowing and silently wrapping around the address space.
Attack vector #6 (integer overflow): Runtimes should use safe arith-
metics when computing addresses in a buffer with untrusted size. ▷ Rela-
tively well-understood in production SDKs, not in research code.
TEE design. We found that the address-related vulnerabilities
in this section are significantly more exploitable in TEE designs
that provide increased attacker control over the shared memory
and enclave memory layouts. For instance, some integer overflow
vulnerabilities require the adversary to control the enclave base
address in a shared address space, as is the case for the Intel SGX [8]
and Sancus [32] designs, but not for ARM TrustZone [34] or Key-
stone [21]. Further, we found that logical errors may arise when
checking variable sized buffers in a shared address space. As de-
tailed below, the exploitability of such logic bugs depends heavily
on the ability of the adversary to trigger certain edge cases (e.g.,
passing a pointer that lies just before the enclave base address),
which might also be considerably easier in single-address space
TEE designs like Intel SGX or Sancus.
Fortanix Rust-EDP. In contrast to the other runtimes described
in this paper, Fortanix’s EDP [11] leverages the type system of
the safe Rust language to disallow inadvertent untrusted pointer
dereferences apart from the dedicated UserSafe type, which trans-
parently sanitizes any pointers passed into the enclave. Rust-EDP’s
shielding system has been explicitly designed to avoid known en-
clave boundary attacks and implements libOS-like functionality
through a deliberately very narrow ocall interface that is kept
invisible to the application programmer. However, our analysis
shows that the promising approach of enforcing pointer sanitiza-
tion through the use of a type systemmay evidently still suffer from
security issues if the implementation in the type itself is incorrect.
We manually scrutinized the implementation of the confined
UserSafe type (part of the Rust compiler’s SGX-EDP target [11])
and found a potentially exploitable integer overflow vulnerability
in the pointer validation logic. Listing 4 shows the relevant is_use
r_range() function, which checks whether an untrusted memory
range specified by a pointer and length falls completely outside the
enclave. Concretely, we observed that the 64-bit integer addition to
compute the end pointer at line 4 may overflow. Note that Rust can
automatically detect integer overflows, but these runtime checks
are only enabled in debug mode, meaning that in production builds
(e.g., rustc -C debug-assertions=off), integer overflows do not
cause an error by default [25].
We confirmed (after isolating the validation function in a dummy
Rust test program) that said function can be made to early-out
and return true at line 5 even when passing an illegal in-enclave
pointer if the enclave base is near the top of the address space.
Note that Intel SGX leaves the enclave base address under explicit
attacker control [8], so this requirement may be satisfied by real-
world attackers. For example, the untrusted runtime can return
a specially-crafted pointer from the alloc() usercall, potentially
leading to in-enclave memory disclosure or corruption, depending
on how the pointer is further used within the enclave. After our
disclosure, the EDP trusted runtime now explicitly asserts that
untrusted sizes returned by alloc() do not overflow.
1 /// `true ` if the specified memory range is in userspace.
2 pub fn is_user_range(p: *const u8, len: usize) -> bool {
3 let start = p as u64;
4 ⭑ let end = start + (len as u64);
5 end <= image_base () || start >= image_base () + (unsafe {
ENCLAVE_SIZE } as u64) // unsafe ok: link -time constant
6 }
Listing 4: Pointer validation in the Rust-EDP UserSafe type.
Google Asylo. Apart from the aforementioned [user_check] is-
sues, the entry points in Asylo’s trusted runtime take care to vali-
date all second-level input buffers. However, our code review also
revealed a subtle logic mistake in the input validation logic itself.
That is, we observed that many of the trusted runtime functions (cf.
Appendix A.3 for a relevant sample) rely on the TrustedPrimitive
s::IsTrustedExtent(input,input_size) library function returning
true to reject the ecall attempt when detecting that an untrusted
input buffer is completely contained within enclave memory.
While this function itself translates to the corresponding sgx_is
_within_enclave() primitive from the SGX-SDK, which is indeed
correct and free from integer overflow vulnerabilities, the logic
mistake occurs when considering malicious input buffers that only
partly overlap with untrusted and enclave memory. For instance,
IsTrustedExtent() will properly return false and the ecall will
still be allowed when passing a lengthy adversarial input buffer
that starts one byte before the enclave base address but continues
into the enclave memory range. Evidently, this may subsequently
lead to trusted enclave memory corruption or disclosure. Hence,
the trusted runtime should instead make use of the proper sgx_is_
outside_enclave() SGX-SDK primitive.
Attack vector #7 (outside ≠ ¬inside): In a shared address space, input
buffers should not fall partially inside the trusted memory region. ▷ Gen-
erally understood in production SDKs, not always in research code.
Graphene-SGX. We discovered a critical integer overflow vul-
nerability in the widely used pointer range validation function
that often computes on untrusted attacker-provided sizes (simi-
lar to the Rust-EDP issue described above). We further found that
Graphene-SGX suffers from the same subtle logic mistake that we
spotted in the Asylo code base: at the time of our review, there
was no sgx_is_outside_enclave() primitive, and all instances of
the intended “abort if not completely outside” were erroneously
checked for “abort if completely inside enclave” (cf. Listing 5 for a
relevant sample). A related type of pointer validation vulnerabili-
ties arises when the libOS allocates variable-sized output buffers in
untrusted memory outside the enclave to be able to exchange data
for ocall arguments and return values. For performance reasons,
Graphene-SGX allocates such shared memory buffers directly on
the untrusted host stack. While the untrusted host stack pointer
is indeed validated to lie outside of enclave memory upon enclave
entry, we observed that the trusted libOS does not properly check
whether the untrusted stack does not overflow into enclave memory
after allocating a new shared memory buffer in the widely used OC
ALLOC macro. Depending on the specific ocall implementation, the
enclave will subsequently copy data to/from the inappropriately
allocated buffer, leading to information disclosure and/or memory
corruption.
Keystone. While Keystone [21] is still a research prototype and
lacked essential functionality when we reviewed its code, we dis-
covered and reported a potential integer overflow vulnerability (cf.
Appendix A.7) in the trusted security monitor’s detect_region_ove
rlap() function, which is used during the creation of an enclave.
However, this overflow was not directly exploitable due to certain
restrictions on region sizes in the Keystone codebase.
Sancus. We found both logical errors and integer overflow vul-
nerabilities in the sancus_is_outside_sm() function provided by the
trusted runtime. Particularly, the current implementation does not
properly detect an untrusted buffer that spans the entire enclave
address range, or a carefully crafted length specifier that triggers
an integer overflow to wrap around the 16-bit address space.
5.4 Pointer-to-pointer validation pitfalls
While the previous sections have focussed on the spatial aspect of
untrusted pointer dereferencing, we also found more subtle vulner-
abilities related to the temporal aspect. That is, whenever a pointer
points to an untrusted address or size (as it is often the case, for
instance, in marshalling structs), the runtime should take care to
first copy the second-level pointer value to a trusted location in
enclave memory before applying the sanitization logic. If this is
not the case, adversaries may overwrite the second-level pointer
in untrusted memory after the validation has succeeded but before
the pointer is dereferenced in the enclave code. This class of vul-
nerabilities is also referred to as “double fetch” bugs in operating
system kernels [37, 53].
Attack vector #8 (double fetch): Untrusted pointer values should be
copied inside the enclave before validation to avoid time-of-check time-of-
use. ▷ Relatively well-understood (once pointer sanitization is applied).
TEE design. Double fetch bugs typically rely on a very nar-
row vulnerability time window and hence can be notoriously hard
to exploit in traditional user-to-kernel contexts. However, recent
research demonstrated how some TEE design decisions may con-
siderably simplify exploitation of synchronization bugs in enclaves.
AsyncShock [50] exploits that Intel SGX adversaries may provoke
page faults in the enclaved execution, and SGX-Step [45] similarly
abuses that privileged SGX adversaries may abuse system timers to
very precisely interrupt a victim enclave after every single instruc-
tion. Finally, Schwarz et al. [37] use a cache side-channel to expose
double fetch bugs in both Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone TEEs.
Graphene-SGX. Scrutinizing Graphene-SGX’s ocall interface,
we found several instances of exploitable double fetch vulnerabili-
ties. Listing 5 provides a relevant code snippet that attempts to sani-
tize the result of the sock_accept system call. First, at line 1, a buffer
ms is allocated in untrusted memory outside the enclave. The struct
buffer pointed to by ms contains another pointer ms->ms_addr that
will be initialized by the untrusted runtime to point to the socket
address returned by the system call. As ms->ms_addr is an untrusted
pointer, the libOS shielding system attempts to properly validate
that it lies outside the enclave at line 5 (modulo the logic bug de-
scribed in Section 5.3) before dereferencing ms->ms_addr a second
time when copying the socket address buffer inside at line 11. How-
ever, since the parent ms struct was allocated in untrusted memory
and has never been copied inside, SGX adversaries can interrupt
1 OCALLOC(ms, ms_ocall_sock_accept_t *, sizeof (*ms));
2 ...
3 retval = SGX_OCALL(OCALL_SOCK_ACCEPT , ms);
4 if (retval >= 0) {
5 ⭑ if (len && (sgx_is_within_enclave(ms->ms_addr , len)
6 || ms->ms_addrlen > len)) {
7 OCALL_EXIT ();
8 return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
9 }
10 ...
11 ⭑ COPY_FROM_USER(addr , ms->ms_addr , ms->ms_addrlen);
Listing 5: Double fetch vulnerability in Graphene-SGX.
the enclave in between lines 5 and 11 and trivially overwrite the ms
_addr field with an arbitrary in-enclave address, potentially leading
to trusted memory disclosure.
5.5 Validating ocall return values
Apart from validating ecall arguments, the enclave trusted runtime
should also take care to properly scrutinize ocall return values
when passing pointers or sizes back into the enclave.
Attack vector #9 (Iago): Pointers or sizes returned through ocalls
should be scrutinized [4]. ▷ Understood, but still prevalent in research
libOSs that shield system calls; one instance in a production SDK.
TEE design. We found that the complexity of the shielding sys-
tem may largely affect this attack surface. That is, SDK-based ap-
proaches typically do not feature a large built-in ocall interface,
whereas libOSs should safeguard against Iago attacks [4] by scruti-
nizing return values from the complex system call interface before
passing them on to the shielded application.
Microsoft Open Enclave SDK. OE’s trusted runtime includes
a oe_get_report() function which is used to provide attestation
functionality to the enclaved binary. Internally, this function per-
forms the same ocall twice; the first time specifying the output
buffer as a null pointer in order to obtain the required quote size.
Based on this size, a buffer is allocated on the enclave heap, and
subsequently filled through a second ocall invocation. We found,
however, that the untrusted runtime can return different sizes for
the two ocall invocations (tracked via CVE-2019-1369). Particularly,
the in-enclave buffer is allocated based on the size obtained from
the first ocall, whereas the size returned by the second ocall is
passed on to the caller of oe_get_report(). Hence, returning an un-
expectedly large size in the second ocall invocation may cause the
enclave application to read or write out of bounds. We experimen-
tally confirmed that OE’s remote attestation example enclave can
leak up to 10 kB of trusted heap memory (this upper bound is due
to an internal limit), possibly at multiple heap locations depending
on other memory allocations.
LibOS-based runtimes. We discovered several exploitable in-
stances of Iago attacks [4] in Graphene-SGX’s ocall interface. For
example, an untrusted system call return value len is later used
to copy len bytes from untrusted memory into a fixed-size buffer
inside the enclave, leading to arbitrary write-past the in-enclave
buffer. To demonstrate this vulnerability, we developed a PoCwhere
the readdir() system call in the untrusted runtime returns an un-
expected length, causing an out-of-bounds write in the enclave.
Similarly, in SGX-LKL’s ocall interface, we found several in-
stances of Iago vulnerabilities where for example the untrusted
pointers returned by mmap() are not checked to lie outside of en-
clavememory, or the untrusted length returned by write() is passed
unsanitized back to the shielded application. To demonstrate how
this can be successfully exploited, we developed an elementary
victim application featuring a common programming idiom where
write() is used to output a buffer piecewise, each time advancing
a pointer with the number of bytes successfully written (i.e., the
system call’s return value). We modified the untrusted runtime to
unexpectedly increment the return value of the write() system call,
causing the shielded application binary to output secret enclave
memory beyond the buffer bounds. Finally, we also confirmed and
reported the existence of similar issues in Google Asylo.
Keystone. Similar to the above SGX runtimes, Keystone pro-
vides system call wrappers to simplify porting of existing code to
an enclave. While Keystone documentation indicates that the de-
velopers are aware of potential issues, the codebase currently lacks
mitigations against Iago attacks. Hence, we developed an exploit
using the write() system call, similar to the SGX-LKL PoC.
5.6 Scrubbing uninitialized structure padding
Apart from pointers and size arguments, enclaves may also pass
composite struct types to the untrusted world. While, as with all
output buffers, we assume that enclave applications do not inten-
tionally disclose secrets through the program-visible state (i.e., the
struct’s individual members), prior research on operating system
kernel [7] and SGX enclave [23] interfaces has shown that padding
bytes silently added by the compiler may still unintentionally leak
uninitialized secret memory.
Attack vector #10 (uninitialized padding): Scrubbing program-visible
state may not suffice for struct outputs [23]. ▷ Especially relevant for
production SDKs that expose the enclave interface to the programmer.
TEE design. This subtle attack vector cannot be easily mitigated
by sanitizing program-visible API state. Possible mitigations include
securely initializing the entire output struct using memset() and/or
doing a member-wise deep-copy, or declaring the output struct as
“packed” so the compiler does not unknowingly introduce padding.
However, both solutions require application-specific knowledge
about the exact struct types being passed. As an important insight,
we therefore found that this attack vector can only be transparently
shielded when the enclave interface is predefined and fixed. That
is, the fixed ocall interface in libOS-based runtimes can indeed be
manually scrutinized for this type of vulnerabilities. However, this
is not the case for SDK-based runtimes that offer a generic enclave
interface defined by the programmer, and hence (opposed to their
shielding responsibility) ultimately outsource the responsibility of
scrubbing uninitialized struct padding to the application developer.
SDK-based runtimes. Lee et al. [23] first demonstrated how
uninitialized struct padding may pose a subtle information leak-
age source in the edger8r-generated code of the Intel SGX-SDK.
Building on their findings, we generalized this attack vector to also
demonstrate its applicability to oeedger8r-generated code in Mi-
crosoft’s Open Enclave SDK, as well as in the Sancus TEE. Similarly,
we confirmed that padding leakage can also occur in Keystone, e.g.,
through the padding of calc_message_t in the demo enclave.
LibOS-based runtimes. We reviewed the ocall interfaces in
the libOS-based runtimes we studied (Graphene-SGX, LKL, Rust-
EDP). Rust-EDP appears to be free of such issues, and Graphene-
SGX explicitly enforces struct packing through a compiler #pragma.
However, SGX-LKL contains at least two instances of an ocall using
a struct with potentially vulnerable padding bytes (sigaction and
siginfo_t). In Google Asylo, most structs passed through an ocall
are explicitly declared as packed, however, we found one instance of
a padded struct BridgeSignalHandler used in the syscall interface.
6 DISCUSSION AND GENERAL MITIGATIONS
The most intuitive solution to defend against our attacks is to in-
corporate additional checks in the enclave code to properly sanitize
ABI state and API arguments/return values. When properly imple-
mented, such checks suffice to block all of the attacks described
in this work, and they have indeed been adopted by the various
projects we analyzed. However, leaving the decision of whether
(and how) to correctly implement numerous interface validation
checks to enclave developers, who are likely unaware of this class
of vulnerabilities, may be problematic. Moreover, even when de-
velopers think about inserting the necessary checks, our analysis
has revealed several recurring pitfalls, including subtle logical bugs,
side-channels, double fetches, and integer overflows. This high-
lights the need for more principled approaches to rule out this class
of vulnerabilities at large, as well as defense-in-depth code harden-
ing measures that may raise the bar for successful exploitation.
Code hardening. Interface sanitization vulnerabilities are closely
related to a wider class of memory safety issues [3, 22], and their
exploitation may hence be partially hindered by established tech-
niques such as heap obfuscation (cf. Section 4.1). Furthermore, SGX-
Shield [40] aims to obstruct memory corruption attacks by random-
izing the memory layout of enclaved binaries shielded by the Intel
SGX-SDK. However, prior research [3] has shown that SGX-Shield
does not randomize the trusted runtime, meaning that the code
we studied would still feature a deterministic and static memory
layout, and may offer numerous gadgets for mounting code reuse
attacks. Further, as the trusted runtime also forms an integral part
of SGX-Shield’s loader [40], any memory safety or side-channel
vulnerabilities in the trusted runtime itself may also be used to dis-
rupt the preliminary randomization stage. While randomizing the
memory layout of the trusted runtime would indeed be desirable,
this constitutes a non-trivial task [3, 40] given its low-level nature,
including hand-written assembly code and static memory addresses
expected by SGX’s eenter and eresume instructions. In this respect,
we want to emphasize that some of the attacks we presented are
free from non-static address dependencies, and hence remain inher-
ently immune to software randomization schemes. For example, the
SGX-SDK strlen() oracle in Fig. 4 depends solely on the fixed ad-
dress of the victim’s SSA frame, which is deterministically dictated
by the SGX hardware and immutable from software.
As a perpendicular code hardening avenue, we recommend to
implement more aggressive responses when detecting pointer vi-
olations in the trusted runtime. That is, most of the runtimes we
studied merely reject the ecall attempt when detecting pointer
poisoning. In the SGX-SDK strlen() oracle attack of Section 5.2,
we for example abused this to repeatedly call a victim enclave,
each time passing an illegal pointer and making side-channel ob-
servations before the ecall is eventually rejected. To rule out such
repeated attacks, and reflecting that in-enclave pointers represent
clear adversarial or buggy behavior, we recommend to immediately
destroy secrets and/or initiate an infinite loop upon detecting the
first pointer poisoning attempt in the trusted runtime.
Hardware-assisted solutions. As a more principled approach
to rule out the confused deputy attacks described in this paper,
solutions could leverage finer-grained memory protection features
in the processor. In particular, tagged memory [51] or capability
architectures [52] appear to be a promising approach to inherently
separate the memory domains of untrusted and trusted code. On
a capability machine [52], pointers are represented at run-time as
unforgeable objects carrying associated permissions and length
fields. The machine ensures that untrusted code can never create
a valid capability that points inside enclave-private memory and
pass it as an argument to an ecall, thereby eradicating an entire
class of pointer dereference vulnerabilities architecturally.
As an example of an alternative tagged memory design, the re-
cently proposed Timber-V [51] architecture provides lightweight
and strong enclaved execution on embedded RISC-V platforms.
Timber-V processors offer enhanced MPU isolation by keeping
track of a 2-bit tag for every memory word, allowing individual
memory locations to be associated with one out of 4 possible se-
curity domains. The CPU further restricts tag updates, and offers
checked memory load/store operations, which take an expected tag
as an argument and trap whenever the actual memory location
being dereferenced does not match the expected tag. Hence, any
pointer poisoning attempts by untrusted code outside the enclave
would be immediately caught by the hardware.
The untrusted pointer dereference issues we identified in this
work bear some similarities with how privileged OS kernel code
needs to properly sanitize user space pointers in e.g., system call
arguments. As a defense-in-depth mechanism, recent x86 proces-
sors support Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP) features
to explicitly disallow unintended user space pointer dereferences
in kernel mode [17]. We encourage further research to investigate
porting such CPU features to enclave mode.
Safe programming languages. The combination of TEEs and
safe programming languages, such as Rust, has been proposed as a
promising research direction to safeguard enclave program seman-
tics, but still requires additional interface sanitizations [48]. The
approach of Fortanix’s Rust-EDP [11] shows how the compiler’s
type system can be automatically leveraged to limit the burden of
pointer sanitization concerns from a cross-cutting concern through-
out the enclave code base to the correct implementation of a single
untrusted pointer type. However, it is important to note that safe
languages by themselves are not a silver bullet solution to our
attacks. That is, the trusted runtime code remains responsible to
bootstrap memory safety guarantees by (i) establishing expected
ABI calling conventions in the low-level entry assembly code, and
(ii) providing a correct implementation of sanitization in the un-
trusted pointer type. In this respect, the subtle integer overflow
vulnerability in Fortantix’s EDP, presented in Section 5.3, demon-
strates that developing both the trusted runtime libraries and the
enclave in safe Rust may still not suffice to fully eradicate pointer
sanitization vulnerabilities.
Finally, as an alternative to Intel’s edger8r tool, the use of sep-
aration logic has been proposed to automatically generate secure
wrappers for SGX enclaves [49]. This approach aims to provide the
advantages of safe languages, and even formal verification guaran-
tees, but still relies on explicit developer annotations.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Our work highlights that the shielding responsibilities in today’s
TEE runtimes are not sufficiently understood, and that various
security issues exist in the respective trusted computing bases. We
showed that this attack surface is large and often overlooked: we
have identified 35 interface sanitization vulnerabilities in 8 open-
source TEE runtimes, including production-quality SDKs written
by security-savvy developer teams. Our analysis further reveals
that the entry points into this attack surface are more pervasive
than merely argument pointers: we contributed a classification of
10 recurring vulnerability classes spanning the ABI and API tiers.
In the defensive landscape, our work emphasizes the need to
research more principled interface sanitization strategies to safe-
guard the unique TEE shielding responsibilities. We particularly
encourage the development of static analysis tools, and fuzzing-
based vulnerability discovery and exploitation techniques to further
explore this attack surface.
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A VULNERABLE CODE SAMPLES
A.1 OE legacy ecall dispatcher
The (legacy) ecall interface _handle_call_enclave() does not vali-
date that arg_in.args points outside the enclave. While this pointer
is subsequently checked by the oeedger8r-generated entry code,
an error code is still written to the in-enclave memory location on
failure (cf. Listing 2). After our report, the legacy handle_call_encl
ave() dispatcher has been removed completely.
1 static oe_result_t _handle_call_enclave(uint64_t arg_in) {
2 oe_call_enclave_args_t args , *args_ptr;
3 ...
4 if (! oe_is_outside_enclave ((void*)arg_in ,
5 sizeof(oe_call_enclave_args_t)))
6 OE_RAISE(OE_INVALID_PARAMETER);
7 args_ptr = (oe_call_enclave_args_t *) arg_in;
8 args = *args_ptr;
9 ...
10 ⭑ func(args.args);
11 ...
Listing 6: https://github.com/Microsoft/OpenEnclave/blob/
93ac313a/enclave/core/sgx/calls.c#L216
A.2 OE built-in attestation ecall
Evidently, a check that validates that arg_in points outside the
enclave was overlooked. We thus can overwrite in-enclave memory
through the write to host_arg->result. Note that the target buffer
has to have a certain size to avoid segfaults in the function _oe_g
et_local_report() that is called within _handle_get_sgx_report()
(this is because the parameter oe_get_sgx_report_args_t is a large
struct). Because of that, _oe_get_local_report() will very likely
fail with the return value OE_INVALID_PARAMETER (0x3) and overwrite
the first four bytes of the memory at host_arg with 0x03000000.
1 oe_result_t _handle_get_sgx_report(uint64_t arg_in) {
2 oe_result_t result = OE_UNEXPECTED;
3 oe_get_sgx_report_args_t* host_arg =
4 (oe_get_sgx_report_args_t *) arg_in;
5 oe_get_sgx_report_args_t enc_arg;
6 size_t report_buffer_size = sizeof(sgx_report_t);
7
8 if (host_arg == NULL)
9 OE_RAISE(OE_INVALID_PARAMETER);
10
11 // Validate and copy args to prevent TOCTOU issues.
12 ⭑ enc_arg = *host_arg;
13
14 OE_CHECK(_oe_get_local_report(NULL , 0,
15 (enc_arg.opt_params_size != 0) ? enc_arg.opt_params : NULL ,
16 enc_arg.opt_params_size , (uint8_t *)&enc_arg.sgx_report ,
17 &report_buffer_size));
18
19 ⭑ *host_arg = enc_arg;
20 result = OE_OK;
21 done:
22 if (host_arg)
23 ⭑ host_arg ->result = result;
24 return result;
25 }
Listing 7: https://github.com/microsoft/OpenEnclave/blob/
93ac313a/enclave/core/sgx/report.c#L388
A.3 Asylo ecall entry point
Asylo’s trusted ecall dispatcher is declared in Intel SGX-SDK EDL
specification as follows: public int ecall_dispatch_trusted_call
(uint64_t selector, [user_check] void *buffer). However, in the
code below, it becomes apparent that the [user_check] argument
buffer is never properly validated before being unmarshalled. This
issue can most easily be mitigated by properly declaring the argu-
ment buffer using edger8r’s [in] pointer attribute instead of the
problematic [user_check] attribute. Further, the validation logic
at line 16 contains a logic mistake which incorrectly assumes that
outside == ¬inside (cf. Section 5.3).
1 int ecall_dispatch_trusted_call(uint64_t selector , void *buffer) {
2 return asylo:: primitives :: asylo_enclave_call(selector , buffer);
3 }
4
5 int asylo_enclave_call(uint64_t selector , void *buffer) {
6 SgxParams *const sgx_params = reinterpret_cast <SgxParams *>(
buffer);
7
8 ⭑ const void *input = sgx_params ->input;
9 ⭑ size_t input_size = sgx_params ->input_size;
10 ⭑ sgx_params ->input = nullptr;
11 ⭑ sgx_params ->input_size = 0;
12 void *output = nullptr;
13 size_t output_size = 0;
14
15 if (input) {
16 ⭑ if (TrustedPrimitives :: IsTrustedExtent(input , input_size)) {
17 PrimitiveStatus status{error:: GoogleError :: INVALID_ARGUMENT ,
"input should lie within untrusted memory."};
18 return status.error_code ();
19 }
Listing 8: https://github.com/google/asylo/blob/e4810bdbac/
asylo/platform/primitives/sgx/trusted_sgx.cc#L98
A.4 SGX-LKL SIGILL signal handler exploit
SGX-LKL intercepts the SIGILL (undefined instruction) to handle
instructions like rdtsc inside the enclave. In this case, the host exe-
cutes rdtsc and the result is passed back into the enclave through
the enclave’s signal handler interface. In case of SIGILL, an adver-
sary can change the untrusted siginfo argument to point into the
enclave, which will then yield the memory contents at that location
as the 64-bit result of rdtsc, as shown by our PoC. This specific
vulnerability can only be exploited if the target in-enclave memory
starts with 0x04000000 (i.e., siginfo->signum==SIGILL). In addition,
the rdtsc result needs to be outputted back to the untrusted side
(e.g., our PoC simply prints it to the terminal). Note that adversaries
can also use the in-enclave signal handler’s execution itself as a
side-channel. Depending on the contents of the memory pointed to
by siginfo->signum different code paths are taken, so established
side-channel approaches may reconstruct the secret-dependent con-
trol through differences in timing [30], page tables [47, 54], or other
microarchitectural elements [24, 46].
1 void __enclave_signal_handler(gprsgx_t *regs ,
2 enclave_signal_info_t *siginfo) {
3 ...
4 int ret;
5 ⭑ switch (siginfo ->signum) {
6 case SIGSEGV:
7 ⭑ ret = handle_sigsegv(regs , siginfo ->arg);
8 break;
9 case SIGILL:
10 ⭑ ret = handle_sigill(regs , siginfo ->arg);
11 break;
12 default:
13 ret = -1;
14 }
15 ...
Listing 9: https://github.com/lsds/sgx-lkl/blob/664eb25a/src
/sgx/enclave_signal.c#L17
A.5 Sancus authentic execution stub
Passing a ciphertext pointer argument that points inside the enclave
may unintentionally decrypt enclave memory, potentially leading
to information disclosure. Interestingly, we observed that untrusted
array index arguments were properly sanitized to safeguard against
well-understood buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
1 void SM_ENTRY __sm_handle_input(uint16_t conn_id ,
2 const void* payload , size_t len)
3 {
4 if (conn_id >= SM_NUM_INPUTS) return;
5
6 size_t data_len = len - AD_SIZE - SANCUS_TAG_SIZE;
7 ⭑ uint8_t* cipher = (uint8_t *) payload + AD_SIZE;
8 ⭑ uint8_t* tag = cipher + data_len;
9
10 uint8_t* input_buffer = alloca(data_len);
11
12 ⭑ if (sancus_unwrap_with_key(__sm_io_keys[conn_id],
13 payload , AD_SIZE , cipher ,
14 data_len , tag , input_buffer))
15 {
16 __sm_input_callbacks[conn_id ]( input_buffer , data_len);
17 }
18 }
Listing 10: https://github.com/sancus-pma/sancus-compiler
/blob/5d5cbff/src/stubs/sm_input.c#L7
A.6 OE string ecall edge wrapper
As part of OE’s “deep copy” marshalling scheme, the _handle_call
_enclave_function() from the trusted runtime properly copies the
entire marshalled input buffer into the enclave (including the string
argument and alleged length which are put into the serialized input
_buffer by the untrusted runtime). The oeedger8r bridge then takes
care to redirect all pointers to the marshalled input buffer. However,
when doing so the auto-generated oeedger8r entry code below does
not explicitly null-terminate the untrusted string argument. Hence,
the trusted user function will incorrectly assume that the string
is properly terminated and may perform out-of-bounds memory
read/writes beyond the end of the string.
1 void ecall_my_ecall(uint8_t* input_buf ,
2 size_t input_buf_size , uint8_t* output_buf ,
3 size_t output_buf_size , size_t* output_bytes_written)
4 {
5 oe_result_t _result = OE_FAILURE;
6 /* NOTE: output buf code removed for sake of space */
7 my_ecall_args_t* pargs_in =( my_ecall_args_t *) input_buf;
8 size_t input_buf_offset = 0;
9
10 /* Make sure buffers lie within the enclave */
11 OE_ADD_SIZE(input_buf_offset , sizeof (* pargs_in));
12 if (! input_buf || !oe_is_within_enclave(input_buf ,
input_buf_size))
13 goto done;
14
15 /* OE_SET_IN_POINTER(s, s_len * sizeof(char)) */
16 if (pargs_in ->s) {
17 ⭑ *( uint8_t **)&pargs_in ->s = input_buf + input_buf_offset;
18 OE_ADD_SIZE(input_buf_offset , (size_t)(s_len*sizeof(char)));
19 if (input_buf_offset > input_buf_size) {
20 _result = OE_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
21 goto done;
22 }
23 }
24 oe_lfence (); /* lfence after checks */
25 ⭑ my_ecall(pargs_in ->s); /* Call user function */
26 ...
27 }
Listing 11: Proxy function generated by oeedger8r for the
EDL specification: public void my_ecall([in,string] char *s).
A.7 Keystone integer overflow
We discovered a potential vulnerability that originates from an
integer overflow in the detect_region_overlap() function which
is used during the process of creating an enclave. Evidently, there
is no check to guarantee that the integer additions do not over-
flow. Suppose that epm_base=0x82800000 and epm_size=100000. If
one passes addr=0x1 and size=0xffffffffffffffff, there is an over-
lap between both regions. However, when these values are put
into the above condition, this evaluates to “no overlap” (zero). The
above issue was not exploitable at the time of discovery: various
constraints imposed on the size prevented the exploitation of this
issue, but it might have been problematic in the future if the overlap
check was used in different parts of the code.
1 static int detect_region_overlap(uintptr_t addr , uintptr_t size)
2 {
3 ...
4 ⭑ region_overlap |= (( uintptr_t) epm_base < addr + size)
5 && (( uintptr_t) epm_base + epm_size > addr);
6 ...
Listing 12: https://github.com/keystone-enclave/riscv-pk/
blob/e24d47c/sm/pmp.c#L71
